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JULIE WEAVER AND CATHERINE
PALMER,
APPELLANTS,
Case No.

950512-CA

-vsBRITE
INC.,

MUSIC

ENTERPRISES,

APPELLEE.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is brought pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, which provides in essential part that an
appeal may be taken from a District Court to the Appellate Court
from all final orders and judgements.

Jurisdiction is based upon

Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2(j), 1953 as amended, which
grants the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over appeals from
judgments of any court of record for which the Court of Appeals
does

not

have

original

appellate

jurisdiction.

Utah

Code

Annotated, Section 78-2a-3 does not grant the Court of Appeals
original jurisdiction over this matter.
This case has been transferred
pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4).
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to the Court of Appeals

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
a.

Whether

the trial

court

erred

in ruling

that the

provisions of the parties' contract regarding "carry-over points"
as a matter of law and within the four corners of the agreement,
was clear and unambiguous?

(Preserved in Transcript for Motion for

Directed Verdict p. 31; and in Memoranda supporting Appellants'
post-trial motions R. 733-734, 773).
b.

Whether the trial count erred in application of the

standard for consideration of the Appellee's motion to dismiss the
case at the end of the presentation of the Appellants' evidence in
the jury trial of this matter?

(Preserved in Transcript for Motion

for Directed Verdict p. 17-18).
c.

Whether

the trial

court

erred

in ruling

that the

provisions of the contract between the parties regarding "carryover points" were not ambiguous?

(Preserved in Transcript for

Motion for Directed Verdict p. 31; and in Memoranda supporting
Appellants' post-trial motions R. 730-731, 734).
d.

Whether the trial court erred in construing the parties'

contract as a matter of law and in not construing the parties
contract against the Appellee, which was the scrivener of the
contract?

(Preserved in Transcript for Motion for Directed Verdict

pp. 31, 50; and in Memoranda supporting Appellants' post-trial
motions R. 730).
e. Whether the trial court erred in failing to interpret the
"carry-over

points"

provision

of

the

contract

in

a

manner

consistent with the eight year course of dealing between the
6

parties, and the representations and admissions of the Appellee's
executive officers, including one of the principal founders of the
Appellee, who was also the principal executive officer of the
Appellee?

(Preserved in Transcript for Motion for Directed Verdict

p. 21).
f. Whether the principles of estoppel and waiver preclude the
Appellee from now asserting that the Appellee also had the right to
exercise the "carry-over points" redemption provision?

(Preserved

in Transcript for Motion for Directed Verdict p. 54; and in
Appellants' post-trial motions R. 698).
Standard of Review on Appeal
In deciding a motion for a directed verdict, the Court must
consider

the

evidence

in

the

light

most

favorable

to

the

Appellants, against whom the motion was directed, and must resolve
every controverted fact in their favor. Boskovich v. Utah Constr.
Co.. 123 Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (1953).
A directed verdict is tantamount to granting a motion for a
nonsuit.
that

On appeal it must be reversed, if the evidence is such

reasonable men

could

arrive at a different

conclusion.

Rhiness v. Dainsie. 24 Utah 2d 375, 472 P.2d 428 (1970).
The Appellate Court should give no deference to the factual
findings or legal conclusions of the trial court, but should review
the facts and apply the proper legal standard de novo. Canfield v.
Albertsons, 841 P.2d 1224 (Ut. App. 1992).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case is a claim made by the Appellants, Julie Weaver and
Catherine Palmer for the breach of sales representative contracts
which they had entered
Enterprises

(Brite).

into with the Appellee,
Pursuant

to

the

sales

Brite Music

representative

contracts, Julie Weaver and Cathy Palmer could derive various forms
of compensation. One of the components of compensation allowed the
accumulation of "points".
monthly

basis,

the

Pursuant to the use of these points on

sales

representative

commission at the highest possible level.
provided

that

excess

points

("carry-over

could

maintain

her

The contract also
points")

could

be

accumulated for "as long as you [the sales representative] desire".
The contract provided that a sales representative could, in
the alternative, cash in her carry-over points pursuant to a
redemption provision available to the sales representative.

This

redemption right of the sales representative was used periodically
over an eight year period of time.
In early 1991, Brite announced that it also had the right to
exercise the redemption provision, and tendered checks for the
relatively small redemption price to Weaver and Palmer. Brite then
denied Weaver and Palmer the right to use their carry-over points
as they had previously done, thereby causing Weaver and Palmer
substantial monetary loss. The Appellants assert that the actions
of Brite constitute a breach of their written agreement.

8

Course of Proceedings
The original complaint of Julie Weaver and Catherine Palmer
was filed on May 16, 1991 (R. 2-16).

The matter was tried to a

jury on December 6-8, 1994.
At the conclusion of the presentation of the case in chief of
Weaver

and Palmer, Brite moved

Transcript

of Motion

for a directed

verdict

for Directed Verdict p. 5) .

(see

Upon the

conclusion of the argument of the motion, the trial court found
that there was no breach of the sales representative contract and
the motion of Brite was granted (Transcript of Motion for Directed
Verdict p. 60).
On January 27, 1995, the trial court entered its Final Order
of Dismissal (R. 687 and Exhibit D attached hereto).

Such order

stated that the trial court found the contract provision to be
unambiguous.

Further that trial court found that Brite also had

the right to exercise the carry-over redemption provision. In such
case, the trial court concluded that Brite had not breached its
agreement with Julie Weaver and Catherine Palmer.
Post-trial motions were briefed to the trial court and oral
argument on the motions was conducted on April 24, 1995 (R. 795).
An Order Denying Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Motions was entered on May
1, 1995 (R. 795-796), and this appeal followed.
Facts
In the decade of the eighties, the Appellants, Julie Weaver
("Weaver") and Catherine Palmer ("Palmer") were two of the most
successful independent sales representatives (Palmer p. 55, 66;
9

Brady pp. 38, 33, 53; Vassel pp. 60)1 of the Appellee, Brite Music
Enterprises, Inc. ("Brite").

Brite is engaged in the development

and marketing of music products, including music tapes and books.
Weaver and Palmer are both residents of Davis County and were
actively involved in developing sales organizations pursuant to the
Brite marketing program.

Weaver became a sales representative in

1980 and Palmer became a sales representative in 1982.

The trial

court found that a contractual relationship did exist between the
parties based upon the 1982 marketing program

(the "Program")

implemented by Brite (see Final Order of Dismissal, January 27,
1995, paragraph 1; R. 687 and Exhibit D attached hereto).
The Program provided that the sales representatives would
receive

compensation

based

upon

the

sales

volume

of

the

representative, and of the sales organization or "down-line" of the
sales representative.

The second key component of the Program

provided that a sales representative could accumulate "points" from
various sources identified in the Program.
The principal source for the accumulation of points was the
sales volume of the sales organization of a representative.

The

accumulated points were applied to a graduated point level of 300,
600, 900 or 1200 points. The point level at which a representative
conducted business for a month determined the percentage for the
computation of the compensation of a sales representative (i.e., at
1

Reference to the trial record is designated by the letter R
and the page number of the referenced material in the record; e.g.
(R. 687). Reference to testimony given at trial is made by
designating the surname of the witness and the page in the
transcript of the testimony of the witness; e.g. (Palmer p. 28).
10

the 1200 point level, the percentage of the sales commissions
earned by the sales representative would be greater than at lower
point levels) (Palmer p. 26, lines 9-13).
The third component of the compensation structure of the
Program was that a sales representative could earn more points in
a month than were required to achieve a particular compensation
level. These excess points could be accumulated for use in future
months (Palmer p. 27, Brady p. 17). These accumulated points are
referred to in the Program as "carry-over points."
The critical aspect of the contractual relationship of the
parties, and of this case, hinges on the fact that the carry-over
points could be applied to satisfy the requirements of achieving a
certain compensation level in a month when the sales representative
did not earn the requisite points during the month.

For example,

it would be possible for a sales representative who had accumulated
sufficient points, to wholly cease personal sales operations for
several months, and yet be entitled to receive compensation at the
highest point level from the sales made by her sales organization
or down-line (Palmer p. 27 lines 10-16, Vassel p. 21).

11

The trial court found that "the relevant provision of the 1982
marketing Program concerning "carry-over points" provided2:
As you continue to exceed 1200 points per
month, the increasing carry-over points may
accumulate for as long as you desire; however,
each increment of 5,000 carry-over points is
redeemable for a check from Brite for $100.
Redeeming points in this manner does not
affect your life-time point accumulation or
the benefits you may eventually derive
therefrom." (emphasis added by Appellants)
The forgoing contractual provision provided both for the
accumulation of carry-over points and for a cash redemption right
by the sales representative. The last sentence of this paragraph,
although also directed to the sales representative (and therefore
helpful to the construction of the paragraph), relates to other
benefits and rewards based on a lifetime accumulation of points
(Brady p. 31, lines 6-14). Though this other reward program is not
central to the matter now before the Court, this final sentence
completes the thought of the entire paragraph which describes only
rights of the sales representatives. The paragraph, by its terms,
grants no rights to Brite, but only the obligation to accumulate
the points or pay the redemption price, if the redemption option is
exercised by the sales representative.
The factual issue before the Court of Appeals is whether or
not both contracting parties had the right to exercise the cash
redemption provision, or whether the redemption right was solely
that

of

the

sales

representative.

2

The

legal

issue

for

See final Order of Dismissal, January 27, 1995, paragraph
1, R. 687, and Exhibit D attached hereto. See also, Palmer p. 31,
lines 9-15.
12

determination by the Court of Appeals is whether the trial court
erred in failing to submit this factual issue to the jury# by
resolving this issue as a matter of law on Brite's motion for a
directed verdict at the end of the plaintiffs7 case.
The evidence produced at the time of the trial of this case
indicated that, at the end of calendar year 1986, Weaver had
accumulated

51,568.84

carry-over

points

and

that

Palmer had

accumulate 79,099.68 carry-over points at the end of calendar year
1987 (Trial Exhibits P-29 and P-57 ;see Exhibits A and B attached
hereto; Palmer p. 72, lines 18-20).
Early in her experience with Brite, Palmer had exercised the
cash redemption provision.

At trial, however, she confessed that

a management employee at Brite had pointed out to her that the
right to use the carry-over points to maintain the highest point
level of compensation was at her option, as a sales representative
(Palmer p. 32) .

The Brite manager noted that it was foolish for

her to redeem 5,000 carry-over points for a mere $100 under the
cash redemption provision of the contract when it would have
considerably greater value when used to maintain the highest
commission level for more than four months. When she realized the
full import of her error, Cathy Palmer stated (Palmer p. 33, lines
19-23):
My gosh, 15,000 points I have cashed in for
$300. That is one full year of retirement,
one full year of retirement, of bonuses on my
management, on my down-line organization which
could have been worth 10-$15,000 to me.

13

The reference to fla full year of retirement" relates to the
representations made by Brite owners and management during the
years from 1982 to 1990 regarding the uses of the carry-over
points.

Ted Brady, the president and a founder of the Appellee

corporation, had

instructed the sales representatives of the

company that they could use their carry-over points during periods
of personal sales inactivity as a result of sickness (Brady p. 18,
19) , pregnancy (Brady p. 18) or church missionary service (Brady p.
19).
Although Mr. Brady failed to acknowledge that he had also said
that the carry-over points could be used for retirement (Brady p.
18, lines 14-18), Mr. Vassel, the executive vice president of
Brite, said that he had explained the marketing program to groups
of 50 to 200 sales representatives at a time in sales meetings
throughout the United States. In these meetings he and others had
specifically taught that the carry-over points could be used for
retirement (Vassel pp. 19-22).

This fact was confirmed by other

witnesses, including Cathy Palmer (Palmer p. 36).

Both Cathy

Palmer and Mr. Vassel testified that the use of carry-over points
for retirement purposes was personally explained to them by Mr.
Brady (Palmer p. 36, lines 18-25; Vassel p. 22, lines 9-13).
Contrary

to

every

notion

ever

presented

to

the

sales

representatives by Brite, its owners and its executive officers,
both past and present (Palmer p. 86, lines 9-12), if Brite could
exercise the right to redeem the carry-over points, the whole
concept of pregnancy leave, sick leave, missionary finances and
14

retirement would be a virtual nullity.

For the sum of $300 Brite

could gobble up an entire year of retirement, and for one or two
thousand dollars Brite could destroy a decade or a lifetime of
work.

In Cathy Palmer's case, Brite sought to eliminate 39 months

of carry-over points at the highest compensation level (1,200
points a month) for only $900 (Palmer pp. 85-86).

These were the

points accumulated by arguably Brite's most recognized sales person
over an eight year period of intensive work.
Beginning as early as 1987, Weaver and Palmer began to use
their carry-over points in the manner for which they were actually
intended, that is; to maintain the highest point and compensation
level, while devoting less time to personal sales activity (Palmer
p. 84, lines 12-24).

This was a well recognized practice for the

years 1987 through 1990.

Brite honored the proper use of carry-

over points for Palmer in the amount of 27,070.33 points (Palmer p.
73, pp. 84-85). Over a four year period beginning in 1986, Brite
honored the proper use of carry-over points by Weaver in the amount
of 34,268.09 points (Trial Exhibit P-57 and Exhibit B attached
hereto).
Beginning in 1982, with the adoption of the carry-over point
component of the Program, until the end of 1990, the parties
established a clear course of dealing between Brite and its sales
representatives with regard to the meaning of the cited contractual
provision.

During this eight year period of time, only sales

representatives exercised the redemption provision for cash (Palmer
p. 86, p. 90, lines 2-3; Brady p. 58; lines 14-18).
15

Those points

that were not redeemed for cash, at the election of the sales
representatives, were used to maintain the point and compensation
level which offered the sales representative the highest monthly
remuneration.
Ted

Brady,

the principal

executive

and

one of the two

principal founders of Brite, explained the marketing program to
Weaver and Palmer.

He was also present when other executive

employees of Brite were both trained and then conducted seminars to
recruit and encourage new sales representatives (Vassel p. 22) .
Each training session and each promotional seminar was devoid of
any reference to the notion that Brite also had a right to exercise
the cash redemption provision of the sales representative contract
(Brady p, 29, lines 17-20; Vassel p. 39; Palmer p. 86, lines 9-15).
Weaver and Palmer, as two of the most successful sales
representatives

in the history

of the company,

were engaged

extensively in the recruitment process and were major presenters at
promotional seminars (Palmer p. 59, lines 23-25).

Brite portrayed

Julie Weaver as the archetypical successful sales representative
and made a recruiting video featuring her (Vassel p. 20). Weaver
and Palmer also sat on the executive board of Brite (Palmer p. 39,
line 9).

Their only instruction, throughout this entire period of

eight years, was that it was solely the right of the sales
representative to accumulate and use the carry-over points, or
exercise the cash redemption provision.
At the end of calendar year 1990, ostensibly for reasons of a
downturn in the business of Brite, Mr. Brady announced that Brite
16

was going to redeem all outstanding carry-over points at the rate
of $100 for each 5,000 points accumulated. Not only was the carryover point component eliminated for the period after the announced
program

change,

but

the

carry-over

points

were

eliminated

retroactively (Palmer p. 74, lined 18-25).
Brite tendered checks to the sales representatives, asserting
that

Brite

had

the

redemption provision.

right

to

exercise

the

carry-over

point

This announcement by the president of the

corporation was the first time that anyone had ever asserted that
Brite had the right to exercise the cash redemption provision. The
draconian elimination of all accumulated carry-over points, and the
elimination of the carry-over point concept entirely from the
Program,

shocked

the

entire

independent

sales

representative

network of the company, caused substantial monetary damages to
Weaver and Palmer, and essentially destroyed

the

independent

representative marketing structure of the company (Palmer p. 103) .
There was no testimony given at the time of the trial that (a)
Brite had the right to redeem the carry-over points, or (b) that
both the sales representatives and Brite had the right to redeem
the carry-over points.
counsel

and

the

legal

Appellee relied solely on the argument of
construction

of

the

carry-over

point

provision of the contract, as a matter of law, without any other
factual support.
Although Brite was the sole scrivener of the document
(Brady p. 10, lines 8-16),

the trial court

found

"that the

foregoing marketing program language is unambiguous and that the
17

use of the term "However" at the beginning of the second sentence
thereof acts as a qualification to the accumulation provision
contained

in the first sentence.

Thus, the ability of the

plaintiffs [Weaver and Palmer] to continue accumulating carry-over
points indefinitely is limited by the redemption wording in the
second sentence" (see paragraph 2 of the January 27, 1995 Final
Order of Dismissal; Exhibit D attached).
Upon a motion for directed verdict at the end of the
Appellants' case, the trial court ruled, as a matter of law, that
Brite also had the right to exercise the cash redemption provision
of the cited contractual language.
Summary of Arguments
1.

On appeal from a directed verdict, the Appeals Court must

examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the Appellants.
If there

is a reasonable basis

in the evidence and

in the

inferences to be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in
favor of the Appellants, the directed verdict cannot be sustained.
2.

It is fundamental that doubtful language in the contract

should be interpreted

against Brite, who was the party that

selected the language and drafted the document.
3.

If the interpretation of the doubtful language of a

contract is to be determined as a matter of law by the words in the
agreement, a cardinal rule in construing such a contract is to give
effect to the intentions of the parties.

Such contract should be

interpreted so as to harmonize all of its provisions and all of its

18

terms# and all of its terms should be given effect if it is
possible.
4.

The doubtful language of the contract between the parties

is ambiguous.

The factual issues presented by the parol evidence

admitted in this matter must be submitted to the jury and not
determined as a matter of law.
5.

The doubtful language of the contract between the parties

is to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the eight year
course of dealing between the parties.

This course of dealing

establishes the fact that only the Appellant sales representatives
had the right to exercise the carry-over redemption provision of
the contract. Such factual matters are to be presented to the jury
and not determined as a matter of law.
6.

Brite has waived its right to claim, and is now estopped

from asserting, that it also has a right to exercise the carryover
point redemption provision.
Argument
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUBMIT TO
THE JURY THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT BOTH THE
APPELLANTS AND THE APPELLEE HAD THE RIGHT TO
EXERCISE THE CASH REDEMPTION PROVISION OR
WHETHER THE REDEMPTION RIGHT WAS SOLELY THAT
OF THE APPELLANTS.
The basis of the trial court's granting of Brite's motion for
a directed verdict is the court's determination that Brite had the
right to redeem the carry-over points of the Appellants, Weaver and
Palmer.

If Brite did not have this right, and only the sales

representatives of Brite could exercise the redemption right, the
19

trial court's judgment would be in error.

If a question of

material fact exists as to which party to the contract had the
right to exercise the redemption provision, a directed verdict
cannot be sustained and that material fact must be submitted to the
jury for determination.
On an appeal from a directed verdict, the Appellate Court
should

give

no

deference

to

the

factual

findings

or

legal

conclusions of the trial court, but should review the facts and
apply the proper legal standard de novo.

Canfield v. Albertsons,

841 p. 2d 1224 (Ut. App. 1992).
In this Court's recent decision

of Klienert

v. Kimball

Elevator Company, 1995 WL 613775, 275 Utah adv. Rep. 44, (Ut. App.
10/19/95), this Court held that:
On appeal from a directed verdict, 'we must
examine the evidence in the light most
favorable to the losing party, and if there is
a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the
inferences to be drawn therefrom that would
support a judgment in favor of the losing
party, the directed verdict
cannot be
sustained.'
Gourdin v. Sharon's Cultural
Educ. Rec. Ass'n., 845 p.2d 242, 243 (Utah
1992) (quoting Graystone Pines, 652 P. 2d at
898). Where there is any evidence that raises
a question of material fact, no matter how
improbable the evidence may appear, judgment
as a matter of law is improper. See Hill v.
Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P. 2d 241, 246
(Utah 1992). emphasis added
In the evidence presented at trial on the question of who had
the right to exercise the redemption provision, it was not only
probable that only the sales representatives had the right, the
evidence was nearly compelling that such was the case.

20

In her

testimony at the time of the trial, Cathy Palmer testified as
follows (Palmer p. 87, lines 9-15):
Q
And all the time that you were with Brite, was there
any— did they every tell you that Brite could redeem
those points, or was it your option?
A
Not at any time. Not at any times. It states
clearly in the printed material that that was your [i.e.
the sales representative's] option. You could redeem
them from Brite. Not by Brite. From Brite.
emphasis added
This testimony of Catherine Palmer, alone, is sufficient to
justify submitting to the jury in this case the question of whether
Brite also had the right to exercise the redemption clause or
whether the redemption provision option was solely the right of the
sales representatives.
Palmer testified elsewhere that she was told by management
representatives of the Company that the redemption option was hers
(Palmer p. 33) .

Bruno Vassel, hired

as the executive vice

president of Brite and trained by its president, Ted Brady, stated
that the option was obviously that of the sales representative
(Vassel p. 39) .

Most compelling, however, is the fact that the

record of the trial proceedings fails to include a single statement
by any witness asserting that Brite also had the right to exercise
the redemption provision.
In this regard, it should be noted that the Appellants called
Mr. Brady as an adverse witness to ask him this very question.
Further, the same question had been asked of Mr. Brady at the time
of

his

deposition

and

the

opportunity

contradicting testimony was afforded to him.
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for

him

to

provide

At the trial, Appellants' counsel asked Mr. Brady to read from
his deposition and answer the question again. The trial transcript
records as follows (Brady p. 29, lines 15-20):
A

Let's see, your question?

Q

Yes

A
'I want you to think about it again. You don't have
any recollection about that being discussed, whose
options (sic) it was.'
I said 'no'.
The immediate

subsequent question of Appellants' counsel

afforded Mr. Brady a third opportunity to declare that it was also
the right of Brite Music to redeem the carry-over points.

In

referring to the redemption language in the contract, Appellants'
counsel asked":
Q
Now, if in drafting these terms that you've
indicated so far, Mr. Brady, if Brite Music could redeem
at will for $100, wouldn't that be incon — if the right
was in Brite to redeem for $100 wouldn't that be
inconsistent with the term 'as long as you desire?'
Wouldn't that be inconsistent?
A
I'm not sure I can answer that (Brady p. 29, lines
21-25, p. 30, lines 1-2).
Having squarely placed this issue within the scope of crossexamination

in presenting Appellants' case

in chief, Brite's

counsel did not elicit any testimony from Mr. Brady that either Mr.
Brady or anyone on behalf of Brite had said, implied or intimated
that Brite also had the right to exercise the redemption option.
Based upon the testimony in this case, and the clear legal
authority affirmed by this Court, the trial court erred in failing
to submit to the jury the factual issue of whether or not Brite
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also had the right to exercise the carry-over point redemption
option.
Reasonable

individuals could differ

in their conclusions

regarding these matters which should not be determined as a matter
of law by the trial court,

A directed verdict is tantamount to

granting a motion for a nonsuit. On appeal it must be reversed, if
the evidence is such that reasonable individuals could arrive at a
different conclusion. Rhiness v. Dainsie, 24 Utah 2d 375, 472 P.2d
428 (1970).
POINT II
THE REDEMPTION OPTION PROVISION OF THE SALES
CONTRACT MUST BE CONSTRUED AGAINST BRITE, THE
SOLE SCRIVENER OF THE DOCUMENT.
The first principle in the construction of a contract is
provided for in 17 AmJur 2d, Contracts, §348, which states as
follows:
It is fundamental that doubtful language in a
contract should be interpreted most strongly
against the party who has selected that
language, especially where he seeks to use such
language to defeat the contract or its
operation, unless the use of such language in
the contract is prescribed by law. Also, in
case of doubt or ambiguity a contract will be
construed most strongly against the party who
drew or prepared it, or supplied a form for the
agreement, or whose attorney drew or prepared
it.
In the case of Abbott v. Christensen, 660 P. 2d 254, 257 (Utah
1983), the Supreme Court affirmed the basic law in Am Jur. that
doubtful terms in a contract should be interpreted against the
party who has chosen such terms.
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In the case of Wincrets, Incorporated v. Bitters, 500 P.2d
1007,

(Utah 1972), the Supreme Court also affirmed the basic

proposition that a contract must be strictly construed against
whoever drafts the contract.
The testimony identifying the party who drafted the sales
representative

contract

is unequivocal.

Brite was the sole

scrivener. The president of Brite testified (Brady p. 10, lines 816) :
Q
Thank you. Are the words and the language and the
terms your language? The language of Brite Music?
A

The language of Brite Music, yeah.

Q
And it was drafted and the language you chose was
the language of you and Mr. Perry?3
A

Correct.

Q
These two ladies [the Appellants] had nothing to do
with choosing the language or the program, did they?
A

I think they did not.

As the sole author of the sales representative contract, and
its terms providing for the redemption of carry-over points, the
provision is to be construed against the interpretation urged by
Brite.

3

Mike Perry was the vice-president of Brite or the first
executive officer of the company under Mr. Brady in 1982 when the
carryover points concept was drafted into the sales representative
agreement (Palmer p. 31, lines 16-24).
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POINT III
THE
INTERPRET
THE SALES
THE TERMS

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
THE REDEMPTION OPTION PROVISION OF
CONTRACT SO AS TO HARMONIZE ALL OF
OF THE PROVISION.

A second significant principle of construction is that a
contract is to be interpreted so as to harmonize all of its terms
and provisions, and all of its terms and provisions should be given
effect, if possible. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates. 752 P.2d
892, 895 (Utah 1988).

In the Buehner Block case, the Utah Supreme

Court re-emphasized certain basic principles of the construction of
contractual provisions.

At page 895 of its opinion, the Court

states:
The interpretation of a written contract may
be a question of law determined by the words
in the agreement. In this regard, a cardinal
rule in construing such a contract is to give
effect to the intentions of the parties, and
if possible, these intentions should be
gleaned from an examination of the text of the
contract
itself.
Additionally,
it is
axiomatic
that
a
contract
should
be
interpreted so as to harmonize all of its
provisions and all of its terms, and all of
its terms should be given effect if it is
possible to do so.
In light of these principles, we are to examine what the trial
court did in this matter.

In the second numbered paragraph of the

Final Order of Dismissal (Exhibit D attached hereto), the trial
court found that the language of the sales representative contract
was unambiguous.

It therefore appears that it was the position of

the trial court that it could determine the interpretation of the
contract provision by the words of the agreement only.
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The matter of the existence of ambiguity in the contract
provision is addressed in Point IV below. For purposes of argument
in this portion of Appellants' Brief however, let us consider that
the provision

is unambiguous.

In such event, the cardinal

principles of contract interpretation referenced above in the
Buehner Block case still apply.
Further, the standard of review in such a case is also stated
clearly by the Court in Buehner Block at page 895:
If a trail court interprets a contract as a
matter of law, as was obviously the case here,
we accord its construction no particular
weight and review its actions under a
correction-of-error standard.
Inviting the Appeal Court's attention to the language to be
construed (the "Subject Paragraph"), Appellants quote the relevant
language from paragraph one of the referenced Final Order of
Dismissal:
As you continue to exceed 1200 points per
month, the increasing carry-over points may
accumulate for as long as you desire.
However, each increment of 5,000 carry-over
points is redeemable for a check from Brite
for $100. Redeeming points in this manner
does
not
affect
your
life-time
point
accumulation
or
the
benefits
you
may
eventually derive therefrom, (emphasis added
by Appellants)
Careful analysis of this contract provision

is aided by

considering each of the components of the paragraph and the parties
referred to in the paragraph. This contract is between Brite Music
Enterprises on the one hand and the sales representative on the
other. The company is referred to once in the subject paragraph as
"Brite".

The sales representative is referred to several times

throughout the agreement by the use of the pronouns "you" or
"your11.
The three separate segments or components of the paragraph may
be analyzed as follows.

The first sentence of the paragraph (the

"First Componentff) refers to the right to accumulate carry-over
points. The Second Component of the paragraph is contained in the
second sentence and relates to a right to redeem 5,000 carry-over
points for the sum of $100.

The Third Component for analysis is

the third and final sentence of the paragraph which refers to a
"life-time point accumulation".
Although the key component for purposes of this appeal is the
Second Component consisting of the second sentence, the Buehner
Block case states that we must harmonize the provisions of the
entire paragraph.

Special consideration should be given to the

Second Component of the paragraph regarding the redemption rights.
The language of this component is as follows:
However, each increment of 5,000 carry-over
points is redeemable for a check from Brite
for $100."
The central issue of this appeal is resolved by answering the
question; "Who has the right to exercise the redemption provision?"
For purposes of analysis and construction of the Second Component,
Appellants state that there are only three possible interpretations
of the phrase.

These three possibilities are listed below.

The

underlined language has been added by the Appellants to facilitate
the analysis of the phrase.
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FIRST POSSIBILITY
However, each increment of 5,000 carry-over
points is redeemable by you for a check from
Brite for $100;
OR
SECOND POSSIBILITY
However, each increment of 5,000 carry-over
points is redeemable by you or bv Brite for a
check from Brite for $100;
OR
THIRD POSSIBILITY
However, each increment of 5,000 carry-over
points is redeemable by Brite for a check from
Brite for $100.
For purposes of argument, and in light of the fact that there
are only two parties to the agreement, the foregoing phrases are
the only logical possibilities which may be considered.
Possibility can, in all likelihood, be eliminated.

The Third
No one has

asserted this position, either in testimony at the time of the
trial, or in argument on Brite's motion for directed verdict.
Further, the matter of the course of dealing between the parties
and the admissions of the president of Brite, as addressed in Point
V below, should eliminate this possibility.

However, if analyzed

strictly as a logical argument based on construction only, the
Third

Possibility

would

be

considered

one

of

constructions which could be accepted by this Court.
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only

three

Because the Second Possibility is the position asserted by
Brite in its motion for directed verdict and because the First
Possibility is the position asserted by the Appellants in response
to Brite's motion

for directed

verdict

and

in this appeal,

Appellants' analysis will focus on the first two alternatives to
the Second Component of the Subject Paragraph.
If this Court should determine that the Subject Paragraph is
unambiguous, then the Appeals Court should analyze the Subject
Paragraph and the language of the Second Component thereof in light
of the principles enunciated in the Abbott case discussed in Point
II of this Brief and according to the principles enunciated in the
Buehner Block case cited above.
If the Appeals Court believes that the First Possibility is
the correct interpretation, then the trial court erred and this
matter should be remanded to the trial court with instructions that
only Weaver

and

Palmer

are able to exercise the

redemption

provision, and the balance of the case relating to the breach of
the contract by Brite and the damages suffered by the Appellants
should be submitted to the jury.
In the event that the Appeals Court determines that the Second
Possibility is the correct interpretation, then Brite also had the
right to redeem the accumulated carry-over points; its actions in
tendering checks to the Appellants to purchase their carry-over
points was sanctioned by the agreement between the parties and the
ruling of the trial court should be affirmed.
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If# however, the Appeals Court should determine that the
Subject Paragraph and the Second Component thereof are ambiguous,
then this matter should be remanded to the trial court for
submission to a jury with proper instructions on the construction
of the Subject Paragraph as set forth in Points I through VI of
this Brief.

In such event, the jury should rightfully determine

this matter which cannot properly be resolved as a matter of law by
the trial court.
Continuing with a strictly legal construction of the First and
Second Possibilities, the Appeal Court's objective is to determine
the persons or entities entitled to exercise the redemption right
consistent with the principles of Abbott and Buehner Block.

To

harmonize the provisions of this section, it is first important to
notice that the pronoun you is the antecedent to each bestowed of
a right.

The Subject

Paragraph provides:

"you

exceed..." regarding the accumulation of points.

continue to
The paragraph

states that this may be done as long as "you desire".

The

redemption does not "affect your life-time point accumulation", and
the paragraph concludes with the reference to "benefits you may
eventually derive...". The only reference to Brite relates not to
a benefit or a right, but relates to an obligation of Brite to pay
for the cash redemption price for the points, if redeemed.

In

reading the paragraph as a whole, and in harmonizing its various
parts, one must conclude that the antecedent for the redemption
right is also "you". the sales representative.
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Although the logical consistency of this argument is apparent,
the inverse analysis of the paragraph is more compelling. There is
absolutely no basis in the language of the paragraph which would
indicate that Brite is the one that had the right to redeem the
carry-over points•

The Second Possibility, which is the position

urged by Brite, is as follows:
However, each increment of 5,000 points is
redeemable by you or by Brite for a check from
Brite for $100.
There is nothing in the balance of the paragraph which can support
the notion of inserting the language by Brite into the Second
Component of the paragraph.
The second analysis for harmonizing the ideas expressed in the
Subject Paragraph comes from focusing on the first two sentences as
a whole.

The concept that Brite had the right to exercise the

redemption provision is inconsistent with the phrase contained in
the first sentence of the paragraph that says that the sales
representative may accumulate the carry-over points "for as long as
you

[the

sales

representative]

desire".

In

construing

the

paragraph, particularly in construing it against the scrivener of
the paragraph, we cannot give effect to the desires of the sales
representative if Brite can unilaterally take away the carry-over
points.
The third analysis for harmonizing the provisions of the
Subject Paragraph is in harmonizing the concepts of the paragraph
with the contract as a whole and the intended uses of the carryover points. As indicated in greater detail at pages 14 and 15 in
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the factual summary, the carry-over points were to be used to
maintain the highest point level of compensation during periods of
personal sales inactivity. This included times of sickness (Brady,
p. 18, 19), pregnancy (Brady, p. 18), church missionary service
(Brady p. 19) and retirement (Vassel pp. 19-22 and Palmer p. 36).

If Brite could exercise the right to redeem the carry-over
points,

the

whole

concept

of

pregnancy

leave,

missionary finances and retirement would be illusory.

sick

leave,

For the sum

of $300, Brite could eliminate an entire year of retirement or
missionary service.

In Cathy Palmer's case, Brite wrongfully

sought to eliminate 39 months of carry-over points for only $900
(Palmer p. 85-86).

On a conservative basis Palmer testified that,

when used as provided in her sales representative contract, these
carry-over points had a value in excess of 31,000 (Palmer p. 85,
line 22).
To accord the trial court's determination as a matter of law
the fullest possible scope, we must consider the misplaced reliance
that the trial court bestowed upon the word "however" that joins
the First and Second Components of the Subject Paragraph.
second paragraph of the Final Order of Dismissal

(Exhibit D

attached hereto), the trial court states that: "the term

at

the

beginning

qualification
sentence.
carry-over

of

the

second

sentence

to the accumulation provision
Thus, the ability
points

is

limited

of plaintiffs

thereof
contained

to continue

by the redemption
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In the

'However'

acts

as

in the

a

first

accumulating

wording

in

the

second

sentence"

[i.e. the Second Component].

This analysis is not dispositive of the question at issue here
for at least two significant reasons.

To designate the word

"however" as a word of "qualification" still does not answer the
question as to who had the right to "qualify" the on-going
accumulation of carry-over points. The First and Second Components
of the Subject Paragraph provide that the points will accumulate
unless they are redeemed.

If the accumulation is qualified by the

redemption, that qualification would properly be a function of the
sales representative's election to redeem the carry-over points.
If a sales representative elected to redeem some of her carry-over
points, her right to use those points to maintain the highest
compensation level would be qualified.

This fact does not grant

Brite the right to exercise the redemption option.
Admitting for purposes of argument that the use of points for
the highest compensation level would be "qualified" by the cash
redemption of those points (thereby making them unavailable for use
to maintain the highest compensation level), Appellants assert that
this characterization of the word "however" does not answer the
question of who had the right to trigger the qualification of the
accumulation of carry-over points by the cash redemption.
For

example,

Possibility

One

and

Possibility

Two,

as

referenced above, both contain the word "however". If "however" is
treated as a word of "qualification", it may be said that in both
instances the ability to continually accumulate carry-over points
is qualified by the cash redemption provision of the Second
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Component of the Subject Paragraph. In the First Possibility, only
the

sales

representative

provision.

In

representative
provision.

the

and

can

Second

Brite

exercise

the

Possibility,

can

exercise

the

cash
both
cash

redemption
the

sales

redemption

In neither instance does the word "however" assist in

the analysis of determining of who has the right to exercise the
cash redemption provision.
The second basis for Appellants' objection to the trial
court's undue emphasis on the word "however" is that the Appellants
disagree with the assertion that the word "however" is a word of
qualification. As presented in the motion of Weaver and Palmer for
a new trial and their motion to set aside the verdict, the
Appellants respectfully disagreed with the trial court regarding
the import of the term "however". In the

memorandum supporting

their

Webster's

motion,

Appellants

provided

the

Dictionary

explanation of the word (R. 732) . This treatment is instructive on
appeal.

Websters

New Collegiate

Dictionary

1973 Ed., defines the

word "however" not as a word of limitation, but as a conjunction.
"Conjunction,"

implies

the

joining

of

alternatives

or

other

courses.
Reading

the First

and

Second

Components

of the Subject

Paragraph together, Appellants submit that a sales representative
had the right to accumulate the carry-over points for as long as
she desired, or, in the alternative or as a second course of
action,

she

could

redemption price.

give up those points

and

receive

a cash

These alternatives, or different courses of
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action, are at the election of the sale representative.
Construing

the

Subject

Paragraph

as

a whole,

and

such

paragraph together with the entire sales representative agreement,
Appellants respectfully submit that only the sales representative
had

the

right

to

exercise

the

cash

redemption

provision.

Construing the paragraph as a whole, and harmonizing its various
parts, the First Possibility is the only proper interpretation of
the Subject Paragraph.
POINT IV
THE FACTUAL ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE ADMISSIONS
OF PAROL EVIDENCE REGARDING ANY AMBIGUITY IN
THE REDEMPTION OPTION PROVISION OF THE SALES
CONTRACT MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY, AND
NOT DETERMINED AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Point III of the Appellants Brief addresses the strict legal
construction of Subject Paragraph relating to whose right it is to
exercise the carry-over point redemption.

This analysis was

undertaken by reason of the trial court's conclusion that the
language of the Subject Paragraph was "unambiguous" (Final Order of
Dismissal, paragraph 2; Exhibit D attached hereto).

Prior to

making this determination at the conclusion of the case in chief of
Palmer and Weaver, the trial court had admitted a plethora of parol
evidence. This testimony was admitted without objection of Brite's
counsel, and even with such counsel's full participation (See cross
examination of Vassel and Palmer at Vassel p. 52, lines 1-14; p.
53, lines 12-24; Palmer p. 104, lines 1-7).
In footnote 11 on page 895 of the case of Buehner Block Co. v.
UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme
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Court addresses the proper manner of proceeding in a case regarding
the construction of a contractual provision.

The Supreme Court

stated that a trial court should first determine whether an
ambiguity exists and then having determined the existence of an
ambiguity, admit parol evidence.

The footnote provides:

[W]hether ambiguity exists is question of law
to be decided by trail court before parol
evidence admitted; Morris, 658 P.2d at 1201;
Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690,
691 (Utah 1977) f,[T]he court should first
examine the language of the instruments and
accord to it the weight and effect which it
may show was intended and if the meaning is
ambiguous or uncertain then consider parol
evidence
of
the
parties'
intentions."
(footnote omitted.).
Nevertheless, the matter of the ambiguity of the Subject
Paragraph was addressed to the trial court (R. 726 Memorandum in
Support of Motion for a New Trial and Motion to Set Aside Verdict;
and Transcript of Motion for Directed Verdict p. 31) , and this
issue is presented on appeal.

Appellants will therefore first

address the existence of an ambiguity in the Subject Paragraph and
secondly consider the parol evidence admitted at trial.
Admitting the parol evidence to aid construction of the
Subject Paragraph and afterwards concluding that the provision was
unambiguous

is error by the trial court.

However, neither

Appellants or Appellee objected to such procedure in the trial
court.
A contract is considered ambiguous if the words used to
express the meaning and intention of the parties are

in a sense that the contract

may be understood
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"insufficient

to reach two or more

plausible

meanings."

Metropolitan Property and Liab. Ins, Co, v.

Finlayson. 751 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), quoting Central
Sec, Mut. Ins, Co, v. DePinto, 235 Kan. 331, 681 P.2d 15, 17
(1984).
Because the existence of ambiguity is a question of law, the
Appeals Court is to accord no particular weight to the trial
court's interpretation and the matter is to be reviewed under a
correction-of-error

standard

(Buehner

Block

supra

p.

895) .

Appellants submit that any possibility of ambiguity could
have been eliminated by Brite, the scrivener of the Subject
Paragraph, if it had expressly stated the antecedent to the words
"is redeemable" in the Second Component of the Subject Paragraph.
Brite failed to do so.

This leaves for de novo consideration by

this Appeals Court whether the First, Second or Third Possibility
listed on page 28 of this Brief is the proper construction of the
Subject Paragraph.
Because

the

antecedent

to

the

two

verbs

prior

to

the

redemption provision in the Subject Paragraph is the pronoun "you"
(i.e. "you continue to exceed" and

"...you desire"), it would be

appropriate as a matter of law for this Court to determine that
"you" [the sales representative] is the antecedent to the next verb
in the Subject Paragraph (i.e. "is redeemable"). The Appeals Court
could therefore determine, as a matter of law, that the redemption
right is exclusively that of the sales representative.
If the Appeals Court is unable to make such determination as
a matter of construction and as a matter of law, the Appellants
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submit that the Second Component is, in fact, ambiguous and that
the selection among the three possibilities of proper construction
of this paragraph must be aided by consideration of the parol
evidence admitted at the trial.

Further, the existence of this

ambiguity would necessitate the consideration of the course of
dealing between the parties as addressed in Point V below.
With

regard

to

the

potential

ambiguity

in

the

Subject

Paragraph, Mr. Vassel's testimony on cross-examination by Brite's
counsel is instructive (Vassel p. 51, lines 25 and p. 52, lines 119).
Q
I want to clarify that we are not talking about
accumulating points here. We are talking about redeeming
those points?
A

Okay.

Q
Clearly, and I have no problem with the fact that a
marketing associate can elect to redeem if they choose
to, right?
A

Right.

Q
Is there anything in this that says that the company
cannot redeem also?
A

Doesn't say either way.

Q
Right. Just says thev [the carry-over points") can
be redeemed, doesn't it?
A
This is
distributors?

written

to

the

representatives

or

Q
I appreciate that but there's nothing that says the
company can't redeem, is there?
A
No, and I think it would be out of context if there
was because this is written to the distributors about
what they can so. (emphasis added)
By Mr. Vassel's testimony
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and the statement

of Brite's

counsel, the redemption language of the Subject Paragraph "doesn't
state either way11 whether Brite had the right to redeem the carryover points. Yet, on its analysis of the language the trial court
ruled as a matter of law that Brite did possess such right.
Appellants submit that, if the language of the Subject Paragraph
does not state either way whether Brite may redeem the carry-over
points, then the language is ambiguous as to such right.

In that

event, parol evidence and the course of dealing of the parties is
essential, and all of these factual issues are to be submitted to
the jury for determination.
On

the

issue

of

parol

evidence,

Appellants

direct

the

attention of the Court to the testimony of Palmer at page 86, lines

Q
And all the time that you were with Brite, was there
any— did they every tell you that Brite could redeem
those points, or was it your option?
A
Not at any time. Not at any times. It states
clearly in the printed material that that was your [i.e.
the sales representative's] option. You could redeem
them from Brite. Not by Brite. From Brite.
(emphasis added)
Palmer further discussed Mr. Brady's instructions to her as
follows (Palmer p. 36, lines 18-25 and p. 37, lines 1-8):
A
. . . And I asked Ted specifically, I said, "Ted,
now you need to make sure this is absolutely clear in my
mind, because I'm telling my new prospects, my new
distributors this. I want to make sure that I'm telling
them accurately that they can build up carry-over points,
as many and as long as they want to for any reason that
they deem necessary, be it retirement," and there was
never any age spoken of for retirement. Just retirement,
sickness, illness, a family tragedy, vacation, anything
you wanted to do.
And Ted said, "Absolutely.
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That's the flexibility

and the benefit of the point system and the carry-over
points.11
Q.
Did he indicate at that time whether you could carry
them over indefinitely?
A.

Absolutely.

See also Palmer's testimony at page 39, lines 2-12:
Q.
Do you recall on other occasions at that time in
management meetings when this question came up on the
issue of allowing a person to use their carry-over
points?
A.
I don't recall a single managers' meeting that at
lease some of us didn't discuss carry-over points,
retirement, the benefit. It was a huge issue. It was a
very important issue to us as what we called, and the
company called — referred to us as career executives.
We weren't part-timers. We were in this serious. We
were building for our future. There was a career for us,
not just a part-time job.
It is not the Appeals Court's purpose here to make a finding
of fact

based upon the parol evidence cited here or elsewhere in

this Brief. The objective here is to determine if, in fact, there
were factual issues that should have been submitted to the jury.
In this regard, reference is again made to Kleinert v. Kimball
Elevator Company supra.

At page two of its opinion, this Court

stated that:
Where there is any evidence that raises a
question of material fact, no matter how
improbable the evidence may appear, judgment
as a matter of law is improper.
In further analysis of the parol evidence presented at trial,
is the substantial testimony regarding the fact that the cash
redemption price was significantly less than the amount that could
be earned by the representative through the use of the carry-over
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points to maintain the highest level of compensation (e.g. Palmer
p. 33 lines 19-23).

This testimony makes the notion that Brite

also had the right to redeem carry-over points wholly inconsistent
with

the

stated

purposes

for

the

carry-over

points.

This

inconsistency demonstrates that these material factual issues are
to be submitted to the jury for determination, and not decided as
a matter of law.
In this regard, the attention of the Appeal Court is directed
to the testimony of Bruno Vassel, the former executive vicepresident of Brite. Mr. Vassel had been a senior executive at Avon
products where he was responsible for Human Resources

in 22

countries and subsequently responsible for world-wide training for
a million and a half Avon sales representatives (Vassel pp. 5-6).

In questioning regarding the carry-over point aspect of the
marketing program, Mr. Vassel testified:
A
I was aware of a provision where if a distributor
wanted to redeem or turn in their points they would get
some money for those points. I was also aware of the
fact that it was so ludicrously little that nobody hardly
ever did it.
Q
I see. Did you ever tell the people in - the
representatives who's right it was to redeem, whether it
was the company's right or the representatives' right?
A
No, that never came up because it wasn't an issue.
It was obvious.
,
Q

Define the term obvious.

A
Well, it was obvious that the distributor had the
right to use their points whenever they wanted to, or not
use them whenever they wanted to.
Note that Mr. Vassel testified that it was the right of the
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sales representative to exercise the redemption provision and that
no one would do so because it was "ludicrously little".

Clearly

the amount to be paid was too small to satisfy the benefits of the
carry-over points as taught by Mr. Vassel in his national training
meetings for Brite.

In these meetings, he referred to the

accumulation of carry-over points as storing them in a "special
box".

He described his presentation to the sales representatives

as follows, (Vassel pp. 21-22, beginning at line 4 ) :
A
So I'd say, 'Here's where the company is so
wonderful. It's as if you have a little box over here
you take those other 800 [points] and you put it in your
special box to be used at some point in the future.' And
then I said, 'Now, in times of sickness or if you're a
woman and you are pregnant and you want to take six
months or a year off, or people — for example, LDS men
and many —
most of the people were LDS in the
organization; not all. I would say, 'If you want to go
on a mission, for the LDS church,' I said, 'There's
examples of people in the company, distributors who have
taken six month off, or who have had a baby, or who have
gone on a mission, and have been able to dip into this
box of carry-over points that they have developed over
time, and they have been able to take those points and
use them, 1,200 per month to permit them to continue to
get those down-line commissions even thought they weren't
working right then.
They had earned it in the past. And so I said to
people, look, this is a form of developing for a
retirement in the future. And I told them, 'We have
examples of people who hit an age where they want to
retire, and for the next several years some of them have
earned enough points and the company has agreed to keep
those in that little box, if you will, so that then those
people on retirement, or whatever, could use those. And
we have examples in the company of people over the next
several years who have used that.'
Q
Was this the very same thing that Ted taught you in
reference to the program?
A
Well, I didn't know it before I got — Ted taught
me. Mary Lou, his marketing person, taught me, and the
sales plan taught me.
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Appellants submit that all of the foregoing testimony was
heard by the jury in this case and that factual issues raised by
the ambiguity should have properly been submitted to the jury for
its determination.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INTERPRET
THE REDEMPTION OPTION PROVISION OF THE SALES
CONTRACT IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE EIGHT
YEAR COURSE OF DEALING OF THE PARTIES.
To further aid in the construction of the Subject Paragraph,
there is available to this Court the testimony regarding the course
of dealing between the sales representative and Brite regarding the
redemption and use of the carry-over points.

This point was

stressed to the trial court at the time of the argument on the
motion for directed verdict (Transcript of Motion for Directed
Verdict p. 21).
The Utah courts have adopted the general proposition that the
course of dealing of the parties is to be used in establishing the
proper construction of an agreement. Power Systems and Control v.
Keith's Electric, 756 P.2d 5, (Ut. App. 1988) and Hecter, Inc. v.
United Sav &. Loan Ass., 741 P.2d 542 (Utah 1987).
Beginning in 1982, with the adoption of the carry-over point
component of the Program, until the end of 1990, the parties
established a clear course of dealing between Brite and its sales
representatives with regard to the meaning of the cited contractual
provision.

During this eight year period of time, only sales

representatives exercised the redemption provision for cash (Palmer
p. 86, p. 90, lines 2-3; Brady p. 58; lines 14-18).
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Those points

not

redeemed

for

cash,

at

the

election

of

the

sales

representatives, were used to maintain the point and compensation
level which offered the sales representative the highest monthly
remuneration.
Ted Brady,

the principal

executive

and one of

the two

principal founders of Brite, explained the marketing program to
Weaver and Palmer, and was present when other executive employees
of Brite were both trained and then conducted seminars to recruit
and encourage new sales representatives

(Vassel p. 22).

Each

training session and each promotional seminar was devoid of any
reference to the notion that Brite also had a right to exercise the
cash redemption provision of the sales representative contract
(Brady p. 29, lines 17-20; Vassel p. 39; Palmer p. 86, lines 9-15).
Beginning as early as 1987, Weaver and Palmer began to use
their carry-over points in the manner for which they were actually
intended, that is; to maintain the highest point and compensation
level, while devoting less time to personal sales activity (Palmer
p. 84, lines 12-24).

This was a well recognized practice for the

years 1987 through 1990.

Brite honored the proper use of carry-

over points for Palmer in the amount of 27,070.33 points (Palmer p.
73, pp. 84-85; Trial Exhibit P-29 and Exhibit A attached hereto).
Over a four year period beginning in 1986, Brite honored the proper
use of carry-over points by Weaver in the amount of 34,268.09
points (Trial Exhibit P-58 and Exhibit B attached hereto).
The eight year course of dealing, and the admissions of Brite
regarding such course of dealing, establish that it was the sole
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right of the Appellant sales representatives to exercise the carryover point redemption provision of the subject agreement.
factual matters

are properly to be submitted

Such

to a jury for

determination and are not to be decided on a motion for directed
verdict.
POINT VI
THE PRINCIPLES OF ESTOPPEL AND WAIVER PRECLUDE
BRITE FROM NOW ASSERTING THAT IT ALSO HAS THE
RIGHT TO EXERCISE THE REDEMPTION OPTION
PROVISION OF THE SALES CONTRACT.
At the time of the argument on the motion for directed
verdict, Appellants' counsel urged the trial court to allow counsel
to argue to the jury (at the conclusion of the case), the issues of
waiver and estoppel (Transcript of Motion for Directed Verdict p.
54). This issue was raised again in Appellants' post-trial motions
R. 698).
An individual is estopped to deny or repudiate his promise
made to another when that individual should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promiseef and does
in fact induce such action or forbearance. See Sugarhouse Finance
Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1980).
Based upon the representations and admissions of Brite's
president and its other executive officers, Bruno Vassel and Mike
Perry, Weaver and Palmer dedicated several years of their lives to
accumulating carry-over points because they were told that they
could do so for as long as they desired.

The language of the

Subject Paragraph further documents Brite's inducement regarding
this matter of accumulating the carry-over points at the election
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of the sales representatives.
The testimony of the promises and representations of Mr.
Brady, Mr. Vassel and Mr. Perry has been quoted previously in this
Brief, and for purposes of brevity is not repeated here.
The sales representatives were entitled to rely upon the
assertion that the right to redeem points was the right of the
sales representative.
statements

The following testimony of Mike Perry's

to Palmer was quoted

Appellants' memoranda

to the trial

court

in the

in support of their post-trial motions

(R.770; Palmer p. 31,32).
Q
And calling your attention to redemption of points,
if any in 1992, did you contact one Mike Perry in
reference to redeeming some of your points?
A
In 1982. You said 1992. In 1982 I did in a way
into a managers' meeting they had asked me to speak at a
regular meeting for all the representatives, and I wanted
a new dress. So I had so many carryover points. I asked
Mike Perry, I said, 'I want to turn in 5,000 of my
carryover points because I'd like a check for $100.' So
when I left the managers' meeting he left me that check,
and a couple of months latter —
Q

Now, can you give us the best time first —

A

That would have been probably September of 1982.

Q

Thank you.

A
So I think probably November of 1982 I still had a
lot of carryover points, and I though this would be a
great way to get $200 extra dollars for Christmas. And
so on the way into a managers' meeting that month I told
Mike Perry, I dais, 'this time I'd like to cash in 10,000
of my carryover points. I'd like a check for $200.'
He said, 'Fine.' Then after the meeting when I went
out to his desk to pick up the check, he said, 'Cathy, I
realize that this is your option to do this if you want.'
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As

to

the

importance

of

Brite's

promises

and

Palmer's

reliance, Palmer testified: (Palmer p. 39, lines 5-12).
A
I don't recall a single managers' meeting that at
lease [sic] some of us didn't discuss carryover points,
retirement, the benefit. It was a huge issue. It was a
very important issue to us as what we called, and the
company called — referred to us as career executives.
We weren't part-timers. We were in this serious. We
were building for our future. There was a career for us,
not just a part-time job.
Based upon their reliance upon the promises of Brite, the
Appellants have the right to submit the matters of waiver and
estoppel to a jury in this matter.
CONCLUSION
Weaver and Palmer submit that the trial court erred in not
submitting

to

the

jury

the

material

issues

regarding

the

construction of their sales representative contracts. When all of
the terms of the subject agreement are construed in light of the
evidence submitted in this case, and when construed against the
scrivener of the document, this matter may not be determined as a
matter of law.
If the Appeals

Court

should

determine

that

the Subject

Paragraph and the Second Component thereof are ambiguous, then this
matter should be remanded to the trial court for submission to a
jury with proper instructions on the construction of the Subject
Paragraph in accordance with cases cited in this Brief.

In such

event, the jury should rightfully determine the factual issues
bearing on the construction of the agreement of the parties.
If this Court should determine, however, that the Subject
Paragraph is unambiguous, then the Appeals Court should analyze the
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Subject Paragraph and the language of the Second Component thereof
in light of the principles of contract construction enunciated in
the cases discussed in this Brief.
If the Appeals Court determines as a matter of law that only
the

sales

representative

can

exercise

the

carry-over

point

redemption provision, then the trial court erred and this matter
should be remanded to the trial court with instructions that only
Weaver and Palmer are able to exercise the redemption provision.
Then the balance of the case, relating to the breach of the
contract by Brite and the damages suffered by the Appellants,
should be submitted to the jury.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

p
lr

day of December, 1995.

/BRUCE L. DIBB
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN,
DIBB & JACKSON
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Exhibit A

CATHY PALMER

Total
(BV)

Sales

Total of
Monthly
Bonus

Total of
Management
Bonus

Carry Over
Points1
(Cumulative)

C a r r y Over
P o i n t s Used
t o Maintain
H i g h e s t Point
Level

1984

128,275.61

$13,914.45

6,486.17

25,088.53

1985

211,647.47

21,545.93

11,266.24

49,162.83

1986

282,436.95

23,676.42

15,275.46

69,702.78

1987

293,724.75

20,134.08

15,243.71

79,099.68

1988

205,833.23

14,353.92

13,046.56

74,392.53

4,707.15

1989

147,873.76

8,158.55

7,915.68

62,533.40

11,859.13

1990

111,664.552

5,324.052

5,324.102

52,029.352

10,504.05

T o t a l Carry Over P o i n t s Honored by B r i t e :
B a l a n c e o f Carry Over P o i n t s
a s o f February 1 , 1 9 9 1 :

27,070.33

10,12QiJS

?7, OA9-35'
Minimum number of months r e m a i n i n g a t
h i g h e s t l e v e l of compensation:
Value o f

t h e b a l a n c e o f t h e Carry Over P o i n t s ;

40ii

months

$32,101-

tbl3.436

1

C u m u l a t i v e C a r r y Over P o i n t s a s of y e a r
No i n f o r m a t i o n

i

PLAINTIFF'S

for

end.

O c t o b e r , November and December of

1990

Exhibit B

JULIE WEAVER

T o t a l Sales
(BV)

T o t a l of
Monthly
Bonus

Total of
Management
Bonus

Carry Over
Points1
(Cumulative)

Carry O v e r
P o i n t s Used
t o Maintain
Highest Point
Level

1983

$368,814.62

$21,619.08

$16,726.29

8,700.63

1984

467,175.25

28,850.36

20,982.28

27,189.33

1985

737,765.11

43,037.41

34,768.28

47,349.48

1986

997,581.10

52,383.84

48,260.10

51,568.84

1987 1,084,949.45

49,484.76

48,050.23

47,710.34

3,858.50

1988

926,432.21

37,147.73

35,620.41

44,836.06

2,874.25

1989

539,785.15

30,750.85

30,650.00

31,159.30

13,676.76

1990

629,213.15

25,672.50

25,598.42

17,300.72

13,858.58

Total Carry Over Points Honored by Brite: 34,268.09
Balance of Carry Over Points
as of February 1, 1991:

16,100.72

Minimum number of months remaining at the
highest level of compensation:
Value o f t h e b a l a n c e of t h e Carry Over P o i n t s :

1 3 . 4 Months
$34,196

PLAVNT1FF
tbl2.436

Cumulative Carry Over Points as of year end.

Exhibit C
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PERMANENT LAW
REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS
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D e a n n a KLEINERT, Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.
KIMBALL ELEVATOR COMPANY, a
U t a h corporation; HRB Company aka
The Boyer
Company, a Utah corporation; The Boyer
Company, a general partnership; 185
S o u t h State A s s o c i a t e s aka Boyer
Foothills Partnership, Ltd., a limited
partnership; Boyer-Gardner Properties
Partnership, a general partnership; H.
R o g e r Boyer, an individual; Kem C.
Gardner, an individual; and 185 South
State Owners' Association, a Utah
corporation, Defendants and Appellees.
No. 940485-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Oct. 19, 1995.
F r e d R. Silvester and Clark A. McClellan,
Silvester & Conray, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant.
S. Baird Morgan and H. Burt Ringwood,
Strong & Hanni, Salt Lake City, for
Appellees.
Before ORME,
BILLINGS, JJ.

P.J.,

and

BENCH

and

OPINION
B E N C H , Judge.
*1 Deanna Kleinert appeals from the trial
court's grant of the Boyer Company's motion
for a directed verdict.
We reverse and
remand.
BACKGROUND

Copr.

fy)

1

[1] In reviewing a grant of a directed verdict,
we view all facts and the inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.
See, e.g., Management
Comm. of Graystone Pines Homeowners Ass'n
v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 898
(Utah 1982); Anderson v. Gribble, 30 Utah 2d
68, 71, 513 P.2d 432, 434 (1973). We recite
the facts accordingly.
In Apiil 1984, Kleinert entered an elevator
on the sixth floor of a building owned and
operated by the Boyer Company.
Kleinert
was trapped inside the elevator for about forty
minutes
while
it
intermittently
and
erratically rose and fell. Kleinert was thrown
about the elevator striking her head, arms,
and legs against the walls, doors, and
handrail. Kleinert was finally able to escape
by prying the doors open and jumping to the
floor below. Kleinert claims to have suffered
severe permanent physical injury and pain as
a result of this incident.
Kleinert brought a strict products liability
claim against Kimball Elevator Company
(Kimball). Thereafter, Kleinert amended her
complaint to assert a negligence claim against
the Boyer Company. Kimball and the Boyer
Company separately moved for summary
judgment.
The trial court granted both
motions and Kleinert appealed to this court.
See Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 854
P.2d 1025 (Utah App. 1993) (Kleinert I ) .
This court affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Kimball,
concluding that summary judgment was
appropriate because Kleinert had not shown
that there was any defect in the elevators at
the time Kimball sold them to the Boyer
Company. Id. at 1027. This court reversed
and remanded the trial court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the Boyer
Company, concluding that Kleinert had
submitted evidence sufficient to raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the Boyer Company had notice of a dangerous
condition. Id. at 1028.
On remand, Kleinert presented the evidence
referred to in her appellate brief in Kleinert I,
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as well as additional evidence of problems or
malfunctions with the elevators.
Kleinert
submitted evidence t h a t some of the problems
and malfunctions involving the tripping of
governor switches could cause an elevator to
stop abruptly. According to Brent Russon,
Kimball's district manager, such a stop could
cause a n occupant of the elevator to lose his or
her balance. Russon also testified that the
elevators experienced "yo-yoing" problems, as
well as problems with earthquake devices and
on-board computers. [FN1] Russon further
testified that he spoke with a representative of
the Boyer Company about the operational
problems with the elevators prior to Kleinert's
incident.
Edward Williams, a Kimball repairman,
testified about specific service calls he
responded to in the Boyer Company building
prior to Kleinert's incident. Williams testified
t h a t he responded to problems with governor
switches, "yo-yoing," and people stuck in
elevators, as well as problems that had no
apparent cause. Williams also testified that
when a governor switch is tripped the elevator
may stop abruptly.
*2 Several other witnesses testified that
they h a d been trapped in the elevators prior to
the date of Kleinert's incident. One witness
testified that she, as well as others in the
building, knew the elevators were "bad" and
t h a t they were "afraid" of them.
Kleinert submitted copies of Kimball's
service logs for the elevators covering the
period prior to Kleinert's incident. These logs
show numerous reports of elevator problems
and malfunctions.
Kleinert also submitted
evidence indicating t h a t the Boyer Company
was aware of the elevator problems prior to
the incident. There was testimony presented
t h a t Kimball as well as others reported the
elevator problems to the Boyer Company.
After the close of Kleinert's case-in-chief,
the Boyer Company moved for a directed
verdict claiming t h a t there was no evidence
t h a t the Boyer Company had knowledge,
either actual or constructive, of any defective
or dangerous condition in the elevators. The
Copr.

M
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trial court granted the Boyer
motion and this appeal followed.

Company's

ISSUES
Kleinert raises the following issues on
appeal: (1) whether the trial court properly
granted the Boyer Company's motion for a
directed verdict;
(2) whether the Boyer
Company should be held to the "common
carrier" standard of care; and (3) whether this
case should be assigned to a different trial
judge on remand because the present trial
judge is biased against her claim.
ANALYSIS
Directed Verdict
[2] Kleinert argues that the trial court erred,
in granting the Boyer Company's motion for a
directed verdict, by concluding t h a t there was
no evidence that the Boyer Company knew, or
reasonably should have known, of dangerous
conditions in the elevators. We agree.
[3] On appeal from a directed verdict, "we
must examine the evidence in the light most
favorable to the losing party, and if there is a
reasonable basis in the evidence and in the
inferences to be drawn therefrom t h a t would
support a judgment in favor of the losing
party, the directed verdict cannot be
sustained."
Gourdin v. Sharon's Cultural
Educ. Rec. Ass'n., 845 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah
1992) (quoting Graystone Pines, 652 P.2d at
898). Where there is any evidence t h a t raises
a question of material fact, no m a t t e r how
improbable the
evidence may
appear,
judgment as a matter of law is improper. See
Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241,
246 (Utah 1992).
Property owners generally have "a duty to
exercise reasonable care toward their tenants
in all circumstances." Gregory v. Fourthwest
Invs. Ltd., 754 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah App.1988)
(quoting Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 726
(Utah 1985)). "When a ... claim is based on
the owner's failure to repair r a t h e r t h a n on
affirmative negligence, the plaintiff has the
burden of showing the owner knew, or in the
exercise of ordinary care should have known, a
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dangerous condition existed and the owner
had sufficient time to take corrective action."
Kleinert I, 854 P.2d at 1028.
*3 In the present case, Kleinert submitted
testimonial
and
documentary
evidence
indicating a history of elevator problems and
malfunctions. While we make no conclusion
with respect to the weight and veracity of
Kleinert's evidence, when viewed in a light
most favorable to Kleinert, the evidence was
sufficient to raise a genuine question of
m a t e r i a l fact as to whether the Boyer
Company "knew, or in the exercise of ordinary
care should have known, a dangerous
condition existed and ... had sufficient time to
t a k e corrective action." Id.
We therefore conclude that because Kleinert
submitted evidence sufficient to raise a
genuine question of material fact, the trial
court erred by granting the Boyer Company's
motion for a directed verdict.
Standard of Care
[4] Kleinert also argues that the Boyer
Company should be held to the commoncarrier standard of care. Having submitted
evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of
m a t e r i a l fact under the standard of care
applicable to property owners generally,
Kleinert has also necessarily raised a genuine
issue of material fact under the higher
standard of care applicable to common
carriers. However, since the legal issue of
w h e t h e r a n elevator operator should be held to
a common-carrier standard of care is likely to
resurface on remand, we address the merits of
Kleinert's claim. See State v. Emmett, 839
P.2d 7 8 1 , 786 (Utah 1992) (holding it
appropriate to address issues that, while not
necessary to resolve appeal, may arise on
remand).
After Kleinert I was decided, the Utah
Supreme Court decided Lamb v. B & B
Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926 (Utah 1993),
which discussed the standard of care to be
applied to amusement ride operators. Id. at
930. I n Lamb, the supreme court stated that
M
[t]he heightened standard of care required of
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common carriers is predicated on the principle
that '[p]ersons using ordinary transportation
devices, such as elevators and buses, normally
expect to be carried safely, securely, and
without incident to their destination.' " Id.
(quoting Harlan v. Six Flags Over Georgia,
Inc., 250 Ga. 352, 297 S.E.2d 468, 469 (1982)
(emphasis added)). The court further discussed
the rationale behind the common-carrier
standard of care:
The "reasonably prudent person" standard of
care is a flexible legal concept requiring a
greater or lesser degree of care according to
the nature of the circumstances that a
reasonably prudent person would consider in
assessing possible risks of injury. Common
carriers are held to a higher standard of care
t h a n the "reasonably prudent person"
standard. See Johnson v. Lewis, 121 Utah
218, 225, 240 P.2d 498, 502 (1952); see also
McMaster v. Salt Lake Transp. Co., 108
Utah 207, 210, 159 P.2d 121, 122 (1945);
Sine v. Salt Lake Transp. Co., 106 U t a h 289,
296, 147 P.2d 875, 879 (1944). Passengers
entrust common carriers with their personal
safety, have little if any opportunity to
protect themselves from harm caused by a
common canier, and pay the carrier for safe
transportation. In addition, the public has
an important stake in having the public
transportation of persons be as safe as
possible.
*4Id.
While the court's statement in Lamb about
elevator owners being common carriers was
dictum, a number of other jurisdictions have
held that elevator owners are held to the
common-canier standard of care. See, e.g.,
Wyatt v. Otis Elevator Co., 921 F.2d 1224,
1227 (11th Cir.1991) (stating t h a t "Alabama
treats a passenger elevator as a common
carrier and requires that one maintaining a
passenger elevator must exercise the highest
degree of care"); White v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 242 F.2d 821, 823 (4th Cir.1957) (holding
"in Virginia owners of elevators are common
carriers and held to the highest degree of care
known to h u m a n prudence");
Jardine v.
Rubloff, 73 m.2d 31, 21 HLDec. 868, 872-73,
382 N.E.2d 232, 236-37 (1978) (holding
"owners of buildings with elevators are viewed
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as common carriers who owe their passengers
the highest degree of care"); Cash v. Otis
Elevator Co , 210 Mont 319, 684 P.2d 1041,
1043 (1984) iholding that elevator owners are
subject to the common-carrier standard of
care); Smith v. Munger, 532 P.2d 1202, 1205
(Okla.Ct.App. 1975) (holding "[t]he owner of
passenger elevators owes to the passengers
using the same the highest degree of care,
vigilance, and precaution").
In light of the supreme court's statement in
Lamb, the preceding authorities, and sound
public policy, we believe that elevator owners
should be held to the common-carrier standard
of care. The elevator performs the function of
a common carrier by transporting people from
one floor to another. The public places its
trust in those who furnish elevators that they
will be transported safely from one floor to
another. Once passengers enter an elevator,
they surrender all control of their situation
and place their safety entirely in the hands of
the owner. Furthermore, the risk presented
when transporting passengers vertically is as
great as transporting passengers horizontally
in a conveyance such as a bus or train. See
Smith, 532 P.2d at 1205.
We therefore
conclude that elevator owners are required to
exercise the standard of care applicable to
common earners.
Judicial Bias
[5] Kleinert argues, for the first time on
appeal, t h a t this case should be remanded to a
new t r i a l judge because the present trial judge
has developed a bias against her claim.
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shall make and file an affidavit t h a t the
judge before whom such action or proceeding
is to be tried or heard has a bias or
prejudice, either against such party or his
attorney or in favor of any opposite party to
the suit, such judge shall proceed no further
therein, except to call in another judge to
hear and determine the matter.
*5 "This rule requires that a party alleging
judicial bias or prejudice must first file an
affidavit to t h a t effect in the trial court."
Wade, 869 P.2d at 11; accord Haslam v.
Morrison, 113 U t a h 14, 190 P.2d 520, 523
(1948) (holding issue of bias or prejudice a
matter determined by trial court "in the first
instance," subject to appellate review); Sukin,
842 P.2d at 926;
see also U t a h Code
Jud.Conduct, Canon 3(E) (providing examples
of potential grounds for disqualification). We
will not therefore address the issue of judicial
bias because it is raised for the first time on
appeal.
CONCLUSION
Kleinert submitted evidence sufficient to
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the Boyer Company was negligent.
The trial court therefore erred by granting the
Boyer Company's motion for a directed
verdict. On remand, the trial court should
apply the common-carrier standard of care to
Kleinert's claim. Any claim of bias must be
presented to the trial court.
Reversed and remanded for
consistent with this opinion.

proceedings

ORME, P. J., and BILLINGS, J., concur.
"We are governed by the general principle
t h a t matters not put in issue before the trial
court may not be raised for the first time on
appeal." Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 926
(Utah App. 1992); accord Wade v. Stangl, 869
P.2d 9, 11 (Utah App. 1994). This principle
applies with equal force where the bias or
prejudice of a trial judge is alleged for the first
time on appeal. Wade, 869 P.2d at 11 Rule
63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
Whenever a party to any action or
proceeding, civil or criminal, or his attorney

FN1 A Kimball technician, testified that "yo-yoing"
is the process whereby an elevator attempts to level
off when it reaches a floor He stated that when an
elevator reaches a floor it might overshoot the floor
by several inches and then move up and down until
it levels off with the floor
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JULIE WEAVER AND CATHERINE
PALMER,
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Plaintiffs,
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*
*

v.

*
*
BRITE MUSIC ENTERPRISES, I N C . , *
*
Defendant.
*

The

above-captioned

December

6,

1994,

and

J u d g e Glenn K.

Iwasaki

C i v i l No. 910903124CN

matter

came

continuing

on

for

through

trial

beginning

December

8,

1994.

P l a i n t i f f s w e r e r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e i r c o u n s e l Thomas A. D u f f i n and
B r u c e L. D i b b , and d e f e n d a n t was r e p r e s e n t e d by i t s c o u n s e l Rick
J.

Sutherland.

plaintiffs
in

commenced c a l l i n g

support

evidence,

F o l l o w i n g j u r y s e l e c t i o n and o p e n i n g

of

their

defendant,

C i v i l Procedure,
basis

that

witnesses

claims.

At

the

pursuant

to

Rule

moved t h e

plaintiffs

had

court

for

failed

to

c o n d u c t amounted t o a b r e a c h of
The c o u r t ,
and

having

Verdict

the

arguments

and

heard
of

and i n t r o d u c i n g
conclusion
50 of

the

of

evidence

plaintiffs'

Utah

Rules

a directed verdict
establish

that

of

on t h e

defendant's

contract.

having considered

plaintiffs,

statements,

all

the evidence p r e s e n t e d

defendant's
plaintiffs'
1

Motion
counsel

for
in

by

Directed
opposition

thereto, determined that no factual issues existed concerning the
breach of contract issue and that

defendant was entitled to

judgment as a matter of law for the following reasons:

1.

Plaintiffs' causes of action were all founded on the

underlying contention that defendant's 1991 redemption of "carryover points" amounted to a breach of contract.

The court finds

that a contractual relationship did exist between the parties
based on the 1982 marketing program implemented by defendant
although

the

precise

legal

nature

of

such

contractual

relationship, for purposes of defendant's motion, need not be
defined*

The relevant provision of the 1982 marketing program

concerning "carry-over points" provided:
"As you continue to exceed 1200 points per
month, the increasing carry-over points may
accumulate for as long as you desire.
However, each increment of 5,000 carry-over
points is redeemable for a check from Brite
for $100. Redeeming points in this manner
does not affect your life-time point
accumulation or the benefits you may
eventually derive therefrom* "
2.

The court finds that the foregoing marketing program

language is unambiguous and that the use of the term "However" at
the

beginning

of

the

second

sentence

thereof

acts

as

a

qualification to the accumulation provision contained in the
first sentence.

Thus, the ability of plaintiffs to continue

accumulating carry-over points indefinitely is limited by the
redemption wording in the second sentence.

2

2>

Defendant's redemption of p l a i n t i f f s ' carry-over points
i

in 1991 was made consistent with the foregoing provision of the
1982 marketing program in that each increment of 5,000 carryover points held by plaintiffs at that tine was redeemed for $100
from defendant.
4.

Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of proving

that defendant's redemption of plaintiffs' carry-over points in
1991 constituted a breach of the foregoing 1982 marketing program
provisions.

Plaintiffs' position that the right of redemption is

exclusively theirs and cannot be exercised by defendant is not
supported by the clear language of the provision itself.
Accordingly, defendant's Motion For a Directed Verdict is
HEREBY GRANTED and plaintiffs' Complaint is dismissed, no cause
of

action, with each party to bear its own costs and fees

incurred herein.
#
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DATED t h i s

day of J a n u a r y , 1995.

BY THE C0U3T:

GLENN K. IrtASAKI
D i s t r i c t Court Judge
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ORDER OF DISMISSAL, postage prepaid, to:
Thomas A. Duffin
Bruce L. Dibb
311 South State Suite 380
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